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ABSTRACT
With the development of artificial intelligence algorithms like deep learning models and the successful
applications in many different fields, further similar trails of deep learning technology have been
made in cyber security area. It shows the preferable performance not only in academic security
research but also in industry practices when dealing with part of cyber security issues by deep
learning methods compared to those conventional rules. Especially for the malware detection and
classification tasks, it saves generous time cost and promotes the accuracy for a total pipeline of
malware detection system. In this paper, we construct special deep neural network, ie, MalDeepNet
(TB-Malnet and IB-Malnet) for malware dynamic behavior classification tasks. Then we build the
family clustering algorithm based on deep learning and fulfil related testing. Except that, we also
design a novel malware prediction model which could detect the malware coming in future through
the Mal Generative Adversarial Network (Mal-GAN) implementation. All those algorithms present
fairly considerable value in related datasets afterwards.
Keywords DeepLearning ·Malware Dynamic Behavior Classification ·MalDeepNet Mal-GAN ·Malware Prediction
1 Introduction
Malware detection is a method for judging the security of computer software, it is a key part of software safety research.
Many malware analysis technologies, such as malware code structure analysis, function analysis and malware defense
technology, which are all based on the detection and the classification. Therefore the advancement and completeness of
the detection method will determine the effectiveness of the malware analysis product and control scheme. Feature-
based malware protection schemes such as anti-virus software are still the most universal network security products
in the current application. How to quickly identify and accurately detect the same family’s malware mutation and
improve the versatility of features in the case of malware variations, packing and evasion, etc. are also important issues
to enhance and guarantee the validity of anti-malware protection.
In addition, new malicious code is continuously created and produced, and variants of the original malware are also
emerge in an endless stream. According "China Internet Security Report for the First Half of 2018": In the first half
year of 2018, 140 million new malicious programs were intercepted by the 360 Internet Security Center totally, and
795,000 new malicious programs were intercepted per day. Among them, the number of malicious programs on the PC
platform was 149,098,000 thereinto 779,000 new malicious programs were intercepted per day. The center captured
2.831 million malicious programs about Android platform, and 16,000 new malicious programs were intercepted per
day. From the statistical data, we can see the new emerging malware identification and prediction has also become a
problem that must be addressed except for the detection of existing malware samples.
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Figure 1: DataCon Sample Structure
1.1 Malware recognition and detection
With the rapid expansion of the number of malware samples, the promptly analysis of the behavior of malware, the
extraction of the features of malware, accurate identification and detection of malware samples become an important
basic means of network security. The malware analysis method composed mainly by two categories: static analysis
method and dynamic analysis method. For the static method, it allows the analyst to have a relatively global view of the
target, and can obtain the overall behavior of the sample by means of cross-analysis, correlation analysis and other
professional technics. Relatively the dynamic analysis method are mainly to focus on tracking the execution process
of the malware sample, and to pay attention to the malicious behavior actually arising during the execution process.
In the actual malware analysis process situation, the analyst always combine these two methods and dataflow while
initiating comprehensive analysis. However, as more and more malware adopt self-protection technologies such as
analysis countermeasure and environment detection, the virtualization-based analysis method is separated from dynamic
analysis and develop to a mainstream complex malware code analysis technology, which is widely used in advanced
malware detection tasks.
Static analysis is a method of analyzing the program file itself without actually running the malware object. Matthew
G. Schultz and others put forward the method of malware detection based on data mining for the first time [1], Mihai
Christodorescu put forward the finite state machine description method for malware sample on the basis of static
analysis method [2], and large number of state transition diagrams related to malware code matching are extracted to
enhance the ability of static analysis.
Nowadays, the malware code polymorphic technology, mutation technology, code dynamic generation technology,
self-modification technology and other anti-analysis technologies are widely used .So it is difficult to discriminate
the execution flow and key data of malicious code not even the reverse analysis only by static analysis method, then
more dynamic technics are integrated in the static methods. The dynamic analysis method is a manner to monitor
the running process of the program by specific tools and extract the flowing data to detect the malicious sample.
Like J. Xu Et Al. [3] proposed that the API call sequence should be mapped to the specific behavior of the malware
target, and the sequence of the target should be extracted dynamically and compared with known malicious code by
Similarity Algorithm to achieve abnormal behavior detection. Y. Ye Et al also proposed a similar malicious code
detection method IMDS [4]. Meanwhile, to improve the performance of dynamic analysis methods, the researchers
proposed and implemented a series of dynamic analysis methods based on virtualization technology, such as Renovo [5],
Omnipack [6], PolyUnpack [7], etc. By analyzing the memory modification instructions, the actual address of the jump
instructions, the hidden code is identified, and the binary file of the target program is reconstructed to deal with the
aforementioned issues about dynamically generated code, distorted code, polymorphic code, and self-modifying code.
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Figure 2: GeekPwn Sample Structure
Dinaburg et. proposed Ether [8] based on the Xen virtualization technology, which detects malicious code by capturing
system calls and context switching, and can detect samples that elude Renovo and PolyUnpack, similar to e. KIRDA [9],
A. Vasudevan, M. Nie [10] and others have put forward the malware detection method based on dynamic behavior
analysis. More, in order to further improve the transparency of malicious code analysis and detection process, AM
Nguyen and others proposed a malicious software analysis method based on AMD SVM called Mavmm [11], which
uses virtual architecture to record the system calls of Linux malicious samples which has the ability to withstand all
kinds of virtualization detection. Chad Spensky and his colleagues propose a physical-machine manipulation-based
approach to malicious code analysis, ie, LO-PHI [12], which is applied to exposing ’zero’ software-based artifacts at
the software level Therefore, it has more advantages in detecting samples with anti-analysis techniques.
Along with the expansion of artificial intelligence learning algorithms, the related techniques and strategy have been
applied in malware sample detection and recognition. For example, INVINCEA has proposed a way of detecting
malicious software based on deep neural network model with 0.1% false positive rate (FPR) and 95% detection rate
can be trained on commercial hardware, as well it can classify the malware samples that cannot be recognized by
conventional detection rules. A method named Featuresmith [13] was proposed to automatically extract malware
features from documents written in natural language and train classifier to detect malware based on these features, by
which could be reduce the manpower cost significantly. Enrico Mariconti and his colleagues proposed behavior-related
API call sequence based method MAMADROID [14], which could detect malware samples with fine performance and
keep a long term detection accuracy until 2 years later. Besides, facing threats caused by the prevalence of ransomware
in recent years, Amin Kharaz and others proposed a method to detect ransomware, namely UNVEIL [15], which
automatically constructing a faker user environment and monitoring the user’s desktop operation like abnormal file
modification.
1.2 Malware family classification
Traditional anti-virus software relies on pattern matching method to detect malware with file and code features. It
is difficult to detect polymorphic and deformed samples in this way. M.Christodorescu et al [16] proposed a feature
detection method for malicious software based on instruction semantics analysis, which can resist common instruction
obfuscation strategies. Similarly, Kolbitsch Clemens et al [17] proposed to model the behavior of malicious samples by
analyzing them in a controlled environment, to characterize the flow of information between system calls in which
malicious samples are used to perform critical actions, and to extract relevant program blocks. The detection model is
matched with the unknown program by executing related program blocks to detect the malware with similar behavior
semantics. For homogeneous malicious code often share the same function, the code structure and functional behavior
between different variants are keeping unchanging. Flake et al [18] proposed a structural similarity-based method
to distinguish homogeneous programs by comparing the similarity of Control Flow Graph (CFG) of functions in the
calling graph for different programs. Sung and others proposed a behavior-based malicious code detection method
SAVE [19], which uses a 32-bit variable to represent system calls to match the monitored malicious code behavior
sequence with probability estimation. Christodorescu et AL [20] put forward the method of using code equivalent
transformation to normalize the malicious code, thereby to improve the recognition rate of the anti-virus engine in the
malware detection and variant family classification tasks.
Zhang et al. [21] proposed MetaAware, a method to detect the execution flow of suspicious programs by matching
malicious code with various system and library calls. Lee, T. Wait [22] and Bailey, M. propose using system messages
to describe the behavior of various codes, which the behavior contours of programs are transformed into a sequence
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Table 1: Key feature of rules in ClamAV
No. Rule
1 Body based signatures
2 Extended signatures format
3 Logical signatures
4 Bytecode signatures
5 Signatures based on container metadata
6 File hash signatures
7 Whitelists
8 YARA rules
of system messages. According to the specific pattern matching algorithm, the differences between the two system
message sequences are calculated, and the malicious code is classified into different families. M. Sun Et al. [23]
proposed a new method, Monet, which combines runtime behavior and static structure to detect known variants of
malware family. This method can deal with 10 different code obfuscation and transformation techniques with high
accuracy.
Beyond those method aforementioned, more and more researchers are inclined to machine learning and deep learning
method when implementing malware family classification tasks. Kolter, J. "Z. ". [24] proposed the 4-gram representation
of code behavior through static analysis and machine learning methods to identify the family class.
Konrad Rieck et al. [25] proposed to detect and classify the malware by neural network algorithms which trained by
malicious code behavior analysis features including malicious code system call sequences. Igor Santos et al. [26]
proposed detecting variants of known malware families based on frequency of appearance of opcode sequences. The
research work of G. Canfora et al. [27] also shows that frequencies of n-grams of opcodes can be applied to detect and
differentiate malware families. It is difficult to cluster the same malware family because different anti-virus software
have diverse labels for one family. Marcos Sebastiain et al. [28] proposed AV Class which employ the semantic
analysis of virus name tags generated by different engines to identify the same family. Karel Bartos et al. [29] proposed
that unknown malicious code variants could be detected by extracting statistical features from network flow without
conventional code fingerprints features. Yu Feng et al. [30] proposed ASTROID, which can automatically extract fixed
features from known malware family samples to detect new homogeneous malicious samples. This method transforms
the homogeneous malicious code detection into maximum satisfiability problem solving by searching the maximum
suspicious common subgraph (MSCS) from a small number of known malware family samples. The results show that
the proposed method is superior to the manual method in detection accuracy and precision rate, also can overcome
behavioral obfuscation and other countermeasures.
1.3 Malware Sample Prediction
The computer users have to invest large cost to maintain the system security for malware attack is a constant reality,
also the information security personnel devote much more to the anti-malware and defensive work to deal with the
detection and control of malware spread and infection. Although the universal rules-based (manual feature extraction)
method of malware recognition has a wide range of industrial applications, it prone to show insufficient in response to
the emergence of malware. Which the analysis costs are at a high level, even cause greatly increase of false positives
rates especially for zero-day malware. Particularly, some heuristic dynamic monitoring tools deployed on computer
system always shows false alarm situation and the system load cannot afford the changing requirements, in which the
monitoring rules are defined by system or user self. Meanwhile, it is difficult to build a general machine learning model
to predict unknown malicious behavior due to the constant change of malicious code even for there are solid foundation
of artificial intelligence technology ,it means most malware classifiers degrades rapidly over time.
Roberto Jordaney and others [31] put forward the Transcend method, which can avoid the degradation of classification
model and ensure the prediction quality of classifier by identifying the concept drift of malicious samples. Sebastian
Banescu et al. [32] proposed a machine learning approach to predict the ability countering code mutation and variation
or reverse engineering, which can also be used to evaluate the strength of the malicious code obfuscation variants that
produced soon afterwards. It can predict or counter the emerging malicious samples, and identify the new samples and
the variant families by deep learning models. And it also could build the automatic malware detection and prediction
system based on deep learning, it will provide a new direction for the anti-malware research and application.
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Table 2: The Result of ClamAV in DataCon Task9
ClamAV DataCon GeekPwnAcc Recall Precision F1_score Acc Recall Precision F1_score
Rule-Based 0.93 83% 96% 0.89 NA NA NA NA
Figure 3: The Dual XG-LB Model Framework
1.4 Malware Analysis
The program exists as a file, and the runtime loads it into memory as a process and executes its instructions. Early
detection of malicious code mainly based on static analysis method, that is, it focus on the analysis of program file
itself, rather than the actual running of the malware sample.
Matthew G. Schultz and others firstly propose a method for malicious code detection based on data mining algorithm [33].
Tony Abou-Assaleh and others have done a lot of research in malicious code static analysis by means of pattern matching.
Bergeron et al. have also made significant contributions to behavior-based malware analysis [34]. The nature of a
sample depends on whether it performs a malicious act, so the effectiveness of static analysis methods is usually based
on the assumption that the static file data can accurately reflect the dynamic command behavior.
However, in the actual static analysis process, the machine code in the program file is often extracted by means of
disassembly method, therefore the corresponding relationship between the machine code and the dynamic instruction
execution is established for next analysis. For the sake of counter static analysis, malicious codes also constantly
keep evolving and developing. At present, malicious code is widely strengthened by kinds of strategies, such as
code polymorphism technology [35], code deformation techniques [36], code dynamic generation techniques [37],
code self-modification techniques [38], etc. This makes it much harder for the static analysis simply to determine the
execution process and the key data of the malicious code, not even to establish the corresponding structure flow of the
malicious behavior for file static data processing, which leads to the detection error.
Andreas Moser uses cryptography to convert malicious code into equivalent code [39], and misleads the disassembly
engine to get the wrong result by replacing a constant operation. At the same time, the 3SAT model is used to describe
the problem of analyzing this kind of code, also the complexity of the 3SAT problem is analyzed and prove be a NP
problem.
Accompanied by the upgrade of malware technology, the countermeasure to static analysis is vary over time. The
malware deformation technologies, such as packing and encryption, are absorbed to the malware production. We finished
a rough statistics analysis, using the malicious code data set for the DataCon 1, the result shows UPX, PECompact
and other common packing measures reach to 15% among the datasets. So itâA˘Z´s crucial and necessary for malware
analysis by considering more about malware dynamic analysis method.
2 The Malware Detection
We trained and tested both the deep learning models (MalNet) and machine learning models which designed for malware
classification with QiAnXin DataCon datasets, and we also achieved the testing in GeekPwn datasets with the Malnet.
1DataSet-Stage1: https://github.com/kericwy1337/Datacon2019-Malicious-Code-DataSet-Stage1,
DataSet-Stage2: https://github.com/kericwy1337/ Datacon2019-Malicious-Code-DataSet-Stage2
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Table 3: Key Feature Selection
Feature Types Feature Description Features Feature Details
API features
Dynamic behaviors of the sample are
mainly implemented by calling the
system API, the API feature is the most
important point of our consideration.
We extract statistical features to
describe the overall characteristics of
the API. In addition, we also need to
extract api-based sequence features,
here using the BOW and TFIDF
methods.
api_name The name of the api.
api_category The category of the api.
api_count The number of api callin the xml file.
api_ratio The ratio of different apicall.
api BOW n-gram BOW n-gram feature ofthe api name.
api TF-IDF n-gram TF-IDF n-gram featureof the api name.
PID features
The PID features represent the type
of sample execution process and other
information.
pid_value The value of pid.
pid_count The number of pid in thexml file.
pid_ratio The ratio of different pid.
pid_category The category of pid.
RET features The RET features show the executionresult of the system call.
ret_value The ret value of api call.
ret_count The number of ret valuein the xml file.
ret_category The category of ret value.
call_name Callers’ name.
call_count The number of callers inthe xml file.
call_ratio The ratio of different callers.
call_category The category of callers.
EXINFO Features
EXINFO is commonly used to describe
extended information about API calls,
often including loaded dynamic link
libraries, paths to write file, and so on.
exinfo_name The name of exinfo.
exinfo_count The number of exinfo inthe xml file.
exinfo_category The category of exinfo.
Reboot Features
According to our observation of the
training data, there is usually a reboot
operation in the malicious sample, so
we extract the feature separately for
this operation.
has_reboot If the sample has a rebootoperation.
Time Information
According to the timestamp of the
sandbox, we can get the time information
of each API call and calculate its
proportion, and build features of the
time ratio.
api_time_ratio Time ratio of different api call.
Table 4: The Dual XG-LB results in DataCon and GeekPwn Task
Machine Learning Model DataCon GeekPwnAcc Recall Precision F1_score Acc Recall Precision F1_score
Dual-XG-LB Model 0.98 96% 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
DataCon Datasets Details: For the malware classification task, the benign and malware PE samples should be classified
with the algorithm trough the xml file, which produced form a sandbox (TQSandbox) executing process. The total
sample number is 45,000 with 30000 training samples and 15000 testing samples.
GeekPwn Dataset2 Introduction: GeekPwn dataset is derived from the APP on Android system, including with 270,000
samples training set and 90,000 samples testing datasets. In the task, the malicious samples should be classified from
good ones through classification algorithm.
2GeekPwn: https://github.com/kericwy1337/Geekpwn-Malicious-Code-Dataset-Trace1
6
Figure 4: The flow of Malware Sample Transformation
Figure 5: HAN (Hierarchy Attention Network) Structure
Then we implemented the conventional rule-based, machine learning algorithm-based and deep learning algorithm-based
malware recognition models respectively in the two types of data sets and the results as following chapters.
2.1 Rule-based method
The dynamic malware sample is the behavior data of the original malicious PE sample file processed by the sandbox
(TQSandbox), which contains the corresponding partial features that can be recognized by humans. So the malware
could be detected through special sample feature rules, therefor most current malware detection systems are based on
this property. We here take the mature rule-based malicious code detection system ClamAV, which mainly based on the
key rules in the table 1.
Because the detection rules of different types of malicious samples are very different, so the GeekPwn’s Android
malicious samples cannot be detected in the ClamAV detection system. The test result of ClamAV in DataCon Dataset
as shown in table 2.
Table 5: Testing Performance of Text-based Malnet 1 and Malnet2
Text-Based Malnet DataCon GeekPwnAcc Recall Precision F1_score Acc Recall Precision F1_score
Malnet 1 0.7777 0.6922 0.6585 0.6749 0.8496 0.8881 0.8503 0.8688
Malnet 2 0.751 0.647 0.6215 0.6340 0.8360 0.8850 0.8309 0.8571
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2.2 Machine Learning method
In addition to Rule-based detection way, we also perform experiments on this task the machine learning based
classification algorithm. Because of the dynamic malware behavior data composed of the execution sequence of the
software and multiple syscalls, and the ratio of training data is not even balanced, then the Boosting classifier [40]
and Lightgbm classifier [41] should be a suitable solution for this issue. Xgboost and lightgbm are currently used in
many issues in the Cyber Security field, such as Chen Z et al. [42] in the detection of DDoS attacks. Dhaliwal S et
al. [43] achieved efficient intrusion detection system using the xgboost model, and MINASTIREANU EA Et al. [44]
implemented click fraud detection by the lightgbm algorithm.
Since gradient boosting corrects the residuals of all weak learners by adding new weak learners to ensure the validity of
the results, we use such a multi-learner-added machine learning model to handle malicious code recognition tasks. We
choose to form a dual model structure through combining xgboost and LightGBM classification methods as shown in
Figure 3, to implement, for the purpose to ensure the performance. We extracted the main features as table 3 through
the dynamic operation of the sandbox used for the dual XG-LB models.
We choose different feature combinations separately for the DataCon samples, and respectively do validation on the
testing datasets. Finally, the best combination of features are API feature, RET feature, EXINFO feature, and reboot
feature. These other features show no obvious improvement for classification rates, while it will change the length of
eigenvector tremendously, so other features are discarded in the model training phase. Meanwhile, the Dual XG-LB
model also used in the GeekPwn task and the corresponding two task testing results are shown in Table 4.
Figure 6: Text-Based Malnet 1
2.3 Deep Learning Method
The deep learning model has achieved great results and achievements in the classification, recognition and prediction of
data types like visual [45], image [46], text [47], audio [48] etc. format data tasks, and even gradually perform superior
to some professionals surpassed the field experts. We also try to solve the malicious code recognition tasks by deep
learning tools. Through the analysis of malicious samples, we can transform malicious samples into text data types
or image data, thus applying deep learning models that excel in text and image tasks, such as in [49, 50, 51], etc.,
the malware are classified by image and text deep learning algorithms. The malware files can be transformed into
mal-image dataset and mal-text dataset through transform algorithms as figure 4 shows. And we build two types of
deep neural networks, Text-Based Malware Deep Network (TB-MalNet) and Image-Based Malware Deep Network
(IB-MalNet) for the malware recognition tasks, and tested on the corresponding data sets.
2.3.1 Text-Based Deep Malnet Design
Through the analysis of malicious sample code, it can be seen that the static data is mainly presented in the form
of text including the header file information, and the association relationship of each element. These features are
consistent with the scenarios of the deep learning text classification model. Inspired by this, we designed a deep learning
classification model based on malware dynamic data text information. In the existing deep learning model suitable for
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Figure 7: Structure of DPCNN
text task processing, the HAN (Hierarchy Attention Network) model [52] structure can keep the structural information
of the entire text as classification model, see in Figure 5.
This HAN framework is work well for malware dynamic text data which including full characteristics and strong
information relevance of the sample. In addition, HAN has the fine structured visualization performance, and it can
directly locate keywords of key segments in the malware sample text. The HAN’s structure can be divided into five parts
according to the feedforward order: word vector input layer, word encoder module, word attention analysis module,
sentence encoder module, sentence attention analysis module, output layer.
By inputting the word vector sequence, the HAN model will output the corresponding hidden vector h word by word
through the word-level Bi-GRU structure. Then it obtain the attention weight by the Uw vector and the dot vector
product of each time step. After that the sentence summary vector s2 can be produced by weighted sum of the attention
weights of h sequence. At the end, the text eigenvector V will be generated by the same Bi-GRU and attention processing
of each sentence, and the text classification result will be reached through the computing of latter dense layer and
classifier of this neural network.
As we can see, the HAN framework is a hierarchical construction process from word to sentence, which is very
consistent with the logic structure of malware dynamic data.
In the dynamic malware recognition task, the structure of the malware text data is very rigorous and the functions
expressed by different part of blocks are very constant while the number and length of sentences of the block are varied
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seriously. Therefore, we designed the network structure based on HAN as the Text-based Malnet 1. We added the
paragraph encoder and paragraph attention modules following the structure of the sentence encoder and the sentence
attention to enhance the expression of the regional concept, as shown in Figure 6.
In the text classification model, besides the GRU-based HAN, there are also the [53, 54] structure of FastText, textCNN,
DPCNN, etc. based on one-dimensional CNN structure. Among these models, DPCNN framework has the largest
number of layers and the deepest structure, therefor it can extract more features in more high dimensions and perform
better accuracy than HAN framework when deal with the text problems with very high nonlinear.
As shown in figure 7, the DPCNN uses a large number of short-circuit layer connections to solve the gradient dispersion
problem due to the deepening of the model. In the meantime, the region embedding layer is added to the input part,
which is merged with the unsupervised embedding input to form a tv-embedding (two-views embedding) structure to
enrich the features. The region embedding is generated by convolution operating after the one-hot lookup produced by
embedding processing.
When applying the DPCNN model to malware classification problems, the unsupervised embedding of MalNet is built
with the short-gram encoding mechanism, for there are large number of unnatural language elements in the malicious
sample text, namely its machine language. Due to the high depth characteristics of DPCNN, the pooling layer plays a
role in integrating sequences with short length, which makes the perceptron filed of input text as a whole become larger.
As shown in Figure 8, the original two adjacent 3-gram input sequences are integrated into one feature area, and the
receptive field becomes six words, after a pooling layer processing. Also, with the model network deepens, higher-level
pooling continues to integrate feature regions that separated previously, ensuring the DPCNN’s long-range dependency
capture capabilities.
Then we implement the Text-based Malnet 1, Text-based Malnet 2 on DataCon and GeekPwn Task, and the results
shown in table 5.
We also generate the heatmap of malware dynamic sample by the fine trained Text-basedMalnet1 and Text-basedMalnet2,
for it can locate the keyword sentences in the dynamic text, as shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10.
Figure 8: Text-based Malnet 2(Short Gram-DPCNN) Pooling
Figure 9: Text Heatmap of Malware by Text-based Malnet1.0
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Figure 10: Text Heatmap of Malware by Text-based Malnet2.0
2.3.2 Image-Based Deep MalNetwork Design
When do classification of dynamic malware samples, the malware text data could be converted into a two-dimensional
image by Malware Image Transformation Methods [55, 56], therefore, the image recognition deep network algorithms
can be used for the malware tasks as following.
First, the text data is converted into a one-dimensional sequence in binary mode, then the adjacent eight binary bits are
combined into one Uint bit (0-255). After that, a line break operation is performed for every N number of Unit digits to
transform the one-dimensional sequence into a two-dimensional image data. For an image deep learning model of a
given input size, it also need to resize the 2D image according to the size requirements. When selecting a model for
classifying malware images, it is speculated that the images converted from the malware text should also including key
structural features for its integrity of dynamic malware text data. However, as shown in Figure 11, the converted picture
is quite different from the natural image. The graphic geometry features of malware image is not clear, and it is hard for
the human to distinguish.
Figure 11: Malware image generation
With this in mind, when build the Image-Based Deep Network model, we decided to use a ResNet network structure
with a deep layer structure and a good solution to the gradient dispersion and explosion problems [57], as shown in
Figure 12.
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The most unique characteristic of ResNet is the short-circuit layer structure. As shown in Figure 13, the core idea of
ResNet is to introduce an "identity shortcut connection" module that allows layer input to skip one or more layers and
pass directly to the deeper layers of the model.
Figure 12: ResNet Structure Figure 13: ResNet Short Layer Structure
If the ResNet short-circuit layer structure is decomposed and expanded as shown in Figure 14, it can be seen that a
ResNet architecture with number i short-circuit layer structures has 2**i different paths, since each short-circuit layer
structure provides two independent paths.
Figure 14: Details of ResNet Short-Circuit Layer
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Table 6: The Comparison of Image-Based Malnet in Malware Tasks
Image-Based Malnet DataCon GeekPwnAcc Recall Precision F1_score Acc Recall Precision F1_score
Malnet 1
50 layers 0.975 0.9666 0.9587 0.9627 0.9831 0.9955 0.9747 0.9850
Malnet 2
100 layers 0.971 0.939 0.9731 0.9557 0.9802 0.9920 0.9729 0.9824
Malnet 3
150 layers 0.9673 0.9362 0.9648 0.9503 0.9799 0.9952 0.9695 0.9822
The depth of ResNet is a key parameter in the malware classification task in the basis of malware image. For the
high-dimensional and subtle features will be varied for different depth layers. We build the IM-Malnet in three structures,
ie. the 50 layers, 100 layers, and 150 layers deep networks, corresponding to Image-Based Malnet1, Image-Based
Malnet2, and Image-Based Malnet3. The related test results in DataCon, GeekPwn, are shown in the table 6. And we
also extract the heatmap of malware dynamic sample under the processing of the three Image-Based Malnets, shown as
in Figure 15.
3 Malware family classification
In the research and analysis of malware, how to classify the malware family of unknown samples in time is very
necessary and significant, for it will improve the speed and efficiency of manual analysis to a great extent. In this paper,
we built a text-based MalClassifier based on text data and an image-based MalClassifier based on image data for the
malware family classification tasks (DATACON).
DataCon Malware Family Clustering Task: the malware PE samples should be clustered with the algorithm trough the
xml file, which produced form a sandbox (TQSandbox) executing process. The total sample number is 60,000.
3.1 Text-Based Malware Family Clustering
The text-based clustering algorithm can discover the inherent structure and distribution characteristics of the malware
text data. Therefore, it can solve unsupervised learning problems well and is widely used in various text tasks. For the
malware family clustering task, some of algorithms show better performance. The clustering algorithms can be divided
into hierarchical clustering, distance-based partitioning clustering, and density-based clustering algorithms.
Hierarchical clustering [58] is the most common method, and its purpose is mainly to construct a hierarchical structure
of clusters. The basic concept of Hierarchical clustering is to continuously merge each document into a predetermined
cluster family based on the similarity of data. It contains agglomerative clustering and split clustering methods, which
usually perform high accuracy while cannot be withdraw or undone after the merge or split operation, so it cannot
correct the wrong decision.
Figure 15: Heatmap of Image-Based Malnet Testing (Malenet1-50, Malnet2-100, Malnet3-150).
The distance-based algorithm mainly divides the data into k disjoint clusters by distance, and each k cluster contains the
same kind of data. The homogeneity is achieved by the similarity between the data. However, it does not guarantee
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Figure 16: Autoencoder Based K-means
local and global optimal solutions, because the number of data points in any data set is always limited, and the number
of different clusters is limited. The local minimum problem can be eliminated by exhaustive search.
The typical distance clustering algorithms are K-means [59] and K-mediod [60] algorithm. It is difficult to cluster
by distance clustering method when the data is nonlinear. Then, the density-based clustering algorithm can be
better implemented, for it mainly based on the density and boundary region of the cluster. The DBSCAN [61] and
DENCLUE [62] are the density-based spatial clustering algorithm widely used.
This paper is based on the analysis of the dynamic behavior of malware, by analyzing the interaction between malicious
code and executing environment, the changes that occur before and after running malicious code in the environment,
and instructions or system call descriptions of malicious code at different levels are captured used for clustering. The
malicious code and the family can judged by whether different malicious code originates from the same malware or
written by the same author or team, and whether shows intrinsic relevance and similarity. The article [63] classifies the
system call graphs that construct behavior by dynamically capturing similarity through malware behavior. [64] et al
implemented the malware family by the similarity of malicious code graph matching, while Kolter [65] used the API
call graph through the data dependency graph between API calls, the longest common substring analysis.
Figure 17: XML Preprocessing Framework
Hu [66] mainly achieved the malware clustering task through transforming the function call graph matching into the
latest neighbor search problem by introducing a multidimensional index structure. These dynamic malware behavior-
based clustering algorithm, although achieving several appreciable results to some extent, still faces barriers that are
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not accurate enough. For a malware’s function call sequence has thousands of nodes averagely, although some of the
extraneous nodes can be removed by pruning, there is still a lot of noise. Therefore, it is very important for the malware
family clustering if the feature selection and data feature dimension reduction are effectively performed for the function
call sequence, it can ensure the extracted information be fully and effectively represent the dynamic behavior of the
malicious code. The same family of malware has the same or similar code fragments in specific behaviors, such as
function calls, custom encryption and decryption functions, function execution time, etc. and their functions are the
same or similar. In addition, there are striking similarities in the state of anti-tracking debugging and the state of the
decision system. Therefore, for the functions of the same malware family and the writing habits of the same author, etc.,
the code fragments of the behavioral operation are very similar, which is the core element for determining homology,
except for the code automatically generated by the compiler.
In view of the problems as mentioned, this paper proposes a K-means clustering algorithm based on the autoencoders [67]
model to construct the Malware Classifier. As shown in Figure 16, the algorithm first normalizes the eigenvalues which
can balance the sum squared errors. Then, the data dimension is reduced by the autoencoders algorithms, and finally
the malware samples are clustered by the k-means algorithm with the dynamic information shown in table 7.
Table 7: The Dynamic Malware Information
features description
api_name The original API refers to the system function that is actually invoked
call_name The process name that calls the API
call_pid The process ID that calls the API
call_time The time to invoke the API
err_code The error code generated by calling the API
ret_value The return value of the original API
status_value The status code generated by calling the API
apiArg_list_value The original API parameter value
apiArg_list_count Number of original API parameters
exInfo_value The value of the extra parameter
exInfo_list count The number of additional parameters usedto supplement the insufficient information of the original API parameters
From the sample data, we can find that the overall data is presented in a serialized format, that is, a sample consists of
multiple action sequences, and an action consists of api_name, call_name, call_pid, err_code, ret_value, status_value,
apiarg, and exinfo. The sample of the same family shows the highly consistent characteristics of the overall action call
sequence under the dynamic behavior analysis. Therefore, the basic logic of our algorithm is to cluster by the action
call sequence.
Dynamic malware samples are XML documents, and traditional document clustering algorithms are not suitable for
XML documents. Traditional semantic text clustering methods are often analyzed from a semantic perspective, and
few semi-structured languages like XML are supported. So we establish a framework as shown in Figure 17 for the
XML preprocessing, it can extract the action sequence in the sample, map it into the two-dimensional matrix, for it
displays some features of the dynamic sample in text form. Therefore, the accuracy of sample converting can enhance
the mighty of the model.
Here we mainly take the TFIDF [68] and doc2vec model into the [69] line text vectorization, followed by Singular
Value Decomposition (SVD) and autoencoders for dimensionality reduction, feature preprocessing and dimensionality
reduction. Then the data has been presented better distribution characteristics, then the K-means method is for clustering,
the K value testing shown in Table 8. And the Mahalanobis distance [70] and adjust Cosine similarity [71] indicator are
used for the clustering model evaluation in addition to the performance on the task testing. The results of each family
clustering algorithm are shown in Table 9 and the visualization results shown in, Figure 18.
3.2 Image-based Malware Family Clustering
Similar to the malware recognition task, we here try to solve the malware family clustering task by the deep learning
models, for the malware text can be converted into an image, and then the image clustering algorithm is used for
malware modeling. There is no obvious geometric structure and contour in the malware sample, so it is necessary to
design a better feature extraction method. So the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Autoencoder model which
can efficiently deal with nonlinear unsupervised problems are used for feature extraction. And the U-net [72] deep
network structure is used to construct and train the self-encoder as shown in Figure 19.
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(a) doc2vec-k-Mean family clustering
(b) SVD-K-Means Family Clustering
(c) Doc2vec + Autoencoder Family Clustering
Figure 18: The Visualization Comparison of Family Clustering Algorithms
When designing a deep learning-based clustering algorithm, the autoencoder is mainly used to ensure that the input data
for the cluster will be fine extracted vector features. Because the self-encoder itself has the ability to handle nonlinear
problems, the output vector no longer needs to be mapped nonlinearly.
In this case, the feature extraction capability requirement for the clustering algorithm itself is decreased. Therefore,
K-means and DBSCAN based clustering algorithm are selected here combining the full-connection network and U-net
deep learning structures to implement the clustering algorithm without additional nonlinear mapping operations. The
test results are shown in Table 10.
16
Table 8: K value Testing for Clustering Models
K Value TFIDF+SVD Doc2vec Doc2vec+autoencoders
50 25.345% 26.564% 24.137%
100 30.103% 31.854% 28.776%
200 42.597% 43.815% 41.587%
300 47.817% 48.227% 46.212%
400 46.936% 46.459% 45.012%
500 46.834% 45.403% 44.211%
600 44.611% 43.903% 42.028%
700 43.101% 43.307% 42.976%
800 41.119% 43.122% 43.067%
Table 9: The Performance of Clustering Algorithms
Feature Extraction Cluster Models Best score Adjusted Cosine Similarity Mahalanobis Distance
DataCon
Competition 48.39%
SVD+K-means K-means 47.817% 0.1713 21.4512DBSCAN 23.561% 0.5113 16.2312
Doc2vec+K-means K-means 48.227% 0.2236 23.6612DBSCAN 25.178% 0.7121 15.8723
Doc2vec + Autoencoder K-means 46.212% 0.4002 19.1378DBSCAN 24.472% 0.7088 15.9789
Table 10: The performance of DeepNetwrok-Based Clustering Algorithm
Feature Extraction Cluster Models Best Score
Mahalanobis distance
between clusters
Adjusted Cosine Similarity
between clusters
PCA + Autoencoder
(Full Connection -layers)
K-means 0.2551 37.1018 0.9796
DBSCAN 0.2359 39.1977 0.9821
Autoencoder(U-net) K-means 0.3050 34.6121 0.9732DBSCAN 0.3167 33.1705 0.9710
4 Malware Sample Generation and Prediction
The structure of Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) [73] is inspired by the two-person zero-sum game in game
theory (that is, the sum of the interests of two people is zero, and the income of one party is the loss of the other party).
It sets the two counterpart players as a generator and a discriminator. The purpose of the generator is to learn and
capture the potential distribution of real data and generate new samples. The discriminator is a classifier designed to
correctly determine whether the input data is real or from the generator. In order to win the game, the two players
need to continuously optimize and improve their own generation and discriminating ability. This learning optimization
process is a Minimax game problem, the purpose of which is to find a Nash equilibrium [74], so that the generator
estimates the distribution of the samples by constructing MalGAN based on the malware training. And some degree of
mutations should be designed during the MalGAN training, so that the generated samples have some new features while
possessing part of properties of original samples. Furthermore, the generated samples can be used for the new malware
prediction combined with the algorithm of similarity, even some malware drift problem could be avoided by this way.
4.1 Text-based Malware Generation
Since the GAN model was proposed, many GAN-based generation models have been derived in the text tasks. Though
text data can be directly imported into the classic GAN network for training after vectorization. However, because the
text sequence has discrete characteristics, so the process of sampling from the distribution of discrete objects is not
derivable. Therefore, the GAN parameters are difficult to update, which affects the performance of the classical GAN
model [75] in text generation. Matt Kusne et al. [76] argued that the discrete data processing limitations of the GAN
model can be avoided by the Gumbel-softmax distribution processing, which is a continuous approximation of the
polynomial distribution based on the softmax function. [77] Using the Gumbel-softmax distribution can reduce the
impact of GAN model training due to data discrepancies to some extent. In 2016, Yizhe Zhang [78] et al proposed
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Figure 19: U-Net-Based autoencoder Model Structure
the TextGAN model, using LSTM as the generator of GAN, CNN as the discriminator of GAN, and also use smooth
approximation to approach the output of LSTM generator, thus solving the discrete gradient problem. In addition, there
are Sequence Generative Adversarial Nets (SeqGAN) [79] and Mask Generative Adversarial Nets (MaskGAN) [80].
This paper adopts the Leak Information Generative Adversarial Nets (LeakGAN) [81] structure, to solve the problem
of long malware text generation. The main advantage of this model is that the discriminator will leak some extracted
features to the generator during the process, and the generator absorb the extra information to guide the generation of
the text sequences.
In LeakGAN’s generator, a hierarchical reinforcement learning structure is used, including the Manager module and
the Worker module. The Manager module is an LSTM network that acts as a role of the intermediary. At each step,
it receives a feature representation from the discriminator (for example, the feature map in CNN) and passes it as a
guide signal to the Worker module. Since the median information of the discriminator should not be known by the
generator in the original GAN, the author refers to this feature representation as leaked information. After receiving the
embedding of this guidance signal, the Worker module also uses the LSTM network to encode the current input, and
then connects the output of the LSTM with the received guidance signal embedding to calculate the next action, ie select
the next word. In the malware text generation tasks, the malicious code dynamic data have high structural features,
more non-natural language morphemes and longer text, so the optimized new version LeakGAN model (MalGAN) is
rather necessary. That means we have to design a GAN model suitable for non-nature language generation.
In contrast, the SeqGAN model is typically limited to short text data within 20 bytes. And currently there is a big
disadvantage in the text generation method based on sequence decision, that is, the probability scalar feedback signal
from discriminator D is sparse, because the text is generated by G in multiple rounds of words, but only when G can
receive feedback from D after the entire sentence has been generated. Moreover, G should have updated its strategy
under the guidance of D, but D’s feedback on this whole paragraph is a scalar with extremely limited information,
which is not enough to preserve the syntactic structure and text semantics in the process and not effectively help G to
learn the updates.
On the one hand, in order to increase the amount of information from discriminator D, it should provide more guidance
in addition to the final discriminant feedback value. After all, D is a well-structured and trained CNN network, not a
black box, so it is entirely possible for D to provide more information. On the other hand, the guidance information
from D is still sparse. In order to alleviate this problem, the hierarchicality in text generation is utilized, that is, the real
text samples are written according to the language level such as semantic structure and part of speech. By breaking
down the entire text generation task into multiple subtasks in a hierarchical structure, the model can learn more easily.
LeakGAN is a new model structure that allows the discriminator D to provide more information to the generator G. It
can handle both the problem of insufficient feedback information and sparse feedback, and consistent with the needs of
malware text generation task.
When generating malware dynamic text, the text should be sequenced first, here we using bag- of- words rules conversion.
Then, we build the text-based MalGAN according to the structure of LeakGAN, the Generator and Discriminator are
respectively constructed as shown in Figure 20.
For take advantage of the high-dimensional information leaked from D, a hierarchical generator G [82] similar to the
FeUdal Network designed by DeepMind is used here. It includes a high-level Manager module and a low-level Worker
module. The Manager module is an LSTM network that acts as an information broker. In each round of generating a
new word, the Manager module will receive a high-dimensional feature representation from the discriminator D, such
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Figure 20: Text-based MalGAN Structure for malware generation
as the feature map in D’s CNN network, and then the Manager module will use this information to form a goal which
acts on the current Worker module. Since the roles of D and G are inherently adversarial, the information in D should
only remain in itself, but now some of the information in D is âA˘IJleakedâA˘I˙ to G, ensuring the evolution and variation
of the sample.
After the Manager module generates the goal embedding, the Worker module encodes the currently generated word
with another LSTM network, and then combines the LSTM output with the target embedding to ensure that it can be
integrated with the Manager’s guidance and current state to generate a suitable new word. Through such a process, the
feedback information from D is not only expressed as the scalar of the discriminating result after the completion of the
whole sentence generation, but also provides more information through the target embedding vector in the process of
sentence generating which will improve the performance of G.
During training process, the Manager module and the Worker module are also updated alternately. Since the gradient
disappears when D is much stronger than G. Inspired by the sorting method in RankGAN, a simple and efficient
ranking-based method called "Bootstrapped Rescaled Activation" is proposed to adjust the feedback size of D. After
this conversion, the expectation and difference of the feedback obtained by each mini-batch will become constant. This
method is equivalent to a value stabilizer, which can be very helpful when the algorithm is sensitive to the value size and
it also avoids the problem of gradient disappearance, which accelerates the convergence of the model. The method of
Interleaved Training is also used here to avoid the problem of mode collapse. After pre-training, the supervised learning
training and adversarial generating are executed in turns. This approach will assist the Mal-GAN model avoid bad local
minima and mode collapse. On the other hand, the supervised learning training is also an implicit regularization of
the generating model, which avoids the model behavior deviating too far from the supervised learning. Through this
training strategy, the malware text generated as shown in figure 21 by the text-based MalGAN deep network.
4.2 Image-based Malware Generation
Whether it is static or dynamic text malware data, both can be treated as two-dimensional image data through the
transformation, which will be suitable for the image GAN deep networks. Moreover, since the image data is not as
discrete as the text sequence, the adaptability to the GAN model is better. In the malware image generation, due to the
structural limitations of the original GAN model itself, and the pictures converted from text are also quite different
from the natural pictures, it is very likely that there will be problems such as mode collapse during debugging when
generated by classic image GAN algorithms.
The main algorithm used for image generation is Wasserstein Generative Adversarial Nets (WGAN) [83], Conditional
Generative Adversarial Nets (CGAN) [84] Information Maximizing Generative Adversarial Nets (InfoGAN) [85],
Deep Convolutional Generative Adversarial Networks (DCGAN) [86], Laplacian Pyramid of Adversarial Networks
(LAPGAN) [87], stack generation Convergence Network (Stack Generative Adversarial Networks, StackGAN) [88] etc.
It can be found that the image of the malware lacks the contours and chromatic aberrations compared with the natural
object image when the malicious code converted into Malware Image. The image information of large amount Malware
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(a) Original Malware Text
(b) Generated Malware text By MalGAN
Figure 21: The Malware Text Sample Comparison
Table 11: The Timeline of Malware Sample of DataCon
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
362 62 1481 4892 4465 8282 5859 6406 6219 5804
belonging to different families is very similar, which indicates that the key features used to distinguish the Malware
image type are hidden deep, and may require a deeper CNN model structure to extract. From this perspective, we here
build the image-based MalGAN with the WGAN deep network structure as shown in Figure 22.
Compared to the original GAN, WGAN is mainly optimized from the loss function. Specifically, WGAN removes the
Sigmoid output layer of the original GAN discriminator and no longer takes the logarithm of the generator and the
discriminator’s Loss. In addition, the parameter of the discriminator is updated each time, WGAN also controls the
absolute value of the parameter so that it does not exceed a fixed constant c. For the image-based MalGAN, we abandon
the momentum-based optimization algorithm (including momentum and Adam), and take RMSProp and SGD to greatly
reduce the mode collapse effect [89]. In the Malware Image generation task, it is a very suitable model. Through the
Mal-GAN model training, new malware image data can be generated by calling Generator, as shown in Figure 21.
4.3 The prediction models of new malware
Definition 4.1 For a generating sample set of G, T1, T2, T3...Tn etc. sample sets are written as T. If G ∩ T 6= ∅, then
G and T are said to have positive coverage.Ti ∈ T , for Ti ∩G 6= ∅ , we say that the element Ti in the T set is predicted
by the G set. If the sample number in T is N, where M is predicted by the G set, we say that the predicted coverage of
the G set to the T set is P=M/N.
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(a) WGAN structure
Figure 22: Image-Based MalGAN
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Figure 23: The Generated Malware Image By Image-based MalGAN
Table 12: The Statistic Analysis of Malware
Case 1 T0 T1 T2 T3 7:1:1:1
Case 2 T0 T1 T2 T3 4:2:2:2
TimeLine 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 NA.
No.of Malware 362 62 1481 4892 4465 8282 5859 6406 6219 5804 NA.
Definition 4.2 S(Ti, G) is the similarity between Ti and G, and f[s(Ti, Gi)] is a similarity function. That is, s(Ti,
Gj)=f[s(Ti, Gi)] is the similarity between Ti and the jth term in G. F[S(Ti,G)]=Smax s(Ti,Gj).
Corollary 1 If S is known, then the corresponding G to T coverage P is P(S), that is, when the similarity is S, the
coverage ratio of G to T is P(S).
We train the MalGAN by the DataCon Malware Data and generate the new samples, the similarity function f(s) is
used to computing the similarity between the generated and the true malware sample, and the coverage ratio P of
the generated data set to the existing ones, thereby selecting the optimal f for new malware sample prediction model
implementation.
After obtaining the sample data (here we use the DataCon dataset sample), we make a statistical division of the time
related sample majority according the time stamp of malware. The overall malware sample range is from late 2008 to
early 2019, as shown in Table 11.
Here we train MalGAN based on the T0 phase malware sample and generate new malicious samples, following
introduce text and image similarity calculation according the rules designed ahead to predict the real malware samples
of T1, T2 and T3. In order to facilitate the comparison of results, we chose two different sample distribution scenarios
as shown in Table 12.
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Figure 24: Architecture of MalGAN-Based Malware Prediction Model
Table 13: The Prediction Covering Rate in case 1 By Text-based MalGAN
St T1 Coverage Rate T2 Coverage Rate T3 Coverage Rate
0.15 1 1 1
0.2 1 1 1
0.25 1 1 1
0.5 0.2699 0.2370 0.2169
0.75 0.017015 0.015758 0.016196
0.8 0.017015 0.015758 0.016196
0.9 0.0007805 0.0004824 0.001206
0.95 0 0 0
Table 14: The Prediction Covering Rate in case 2 By Text-based MalGAN
St T1 Coverage Rate T2 Coverage Rate T3 Coverage Rate
0.15 1 1 1
0.2 1 1 1
0.25 1 1 1
0.5 0.194398682 0.1673053404 0.2026948349
0.75 0.0366360712 0.0207908683 0.015969392
0.8 0.0366360712 0.0207908683 0.015969392
0.9 0.006982035 0.0078271504 0.0002495217
0.95 0 0 0
That is, The prediction data set TG (G-Data) is generated based on T0, and the samples of the T1, T2, and T3 phases
will be used to perform the similarity calculation with the G-Data (similarity calculation model). The sample number of
TG generated by the Mal-GAN for case 1 and case 2 is 5000 and the prediction model is shown as figure 24.
4.3.1 Text MalGAN Based Malware Prediction
In the text similarity calculation, we use Cosine Similarity (Y1) and BiLingual Evaluation Understudy Y2 (BLEU) [90,
91] as the evaluation factors for the similarity function between the generated sample and the Tth real sample.
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We set St = a1 ∗ Y 1 + a2 ∗ Y 2, for initiation we choose a1 = 50%, a2 = 50%. The prediction covering rate by
text-MalGAN is shown in table 13, 14.
4.3.2 Image MalGAN Based Malware Prediction
For the malware image based prediction model, we choose X1( Wasserstein Distance), X2 (KullbackâA˘S¸Leibler
divergence)and X3(Jensen-Shannon) [92, 93, 94] as the parameters for the similarity function.
Si = b1 ∗X1 + b2 ∗X2 + b3 ∗X3
For initiation B1 =
1
3
, b2 =
1
3
, b3 =
1
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And the prediction results based image MalGAN are shown in table 15,16.
Table 15: The Prediction Covering Rate in case 1 By Imaged-based MalGAN
St T1 Coverage Rate T2 Coverage Rate T3 Coverage Rate
0.15 0.9996877927 1 1
0.2 0.9993755854 0.9998392024 0.9993108201
0.25 0.9975023416 0.9990352147 0.9968986906
0.5 0.6331564159 0.4584338318 0.4545141282
0.75 0.161879488 0.0857050973 0.0547898001
0.8 0.12051202 0.0501688374 0.0260165403
0.9 0.0121760849 0.0110950314 0.0041350793
0.95 0 0 0
Table 16: The Prediction Covering Rate in case 2 By Image-based MalGAN
St T1 Coverage Rate T2 Coverage Rate T3 Coverage Rate
0.15 1 1 1
0.2 0.9998431003 0.9999184672 1
0.25 0.9996862007 0.9997554015 0.9998336522
0.5 0.8489840747 0.8376681614 0.727522249
0.75 0.2341727465 0.2444353852 0.1221824836
0.8 0.1695300855 0.2003261313 0.0850869167
0.9 0.0099631286 0.0281288219 0.0094818265
0.95 0 0 0
4.3.3 Hybrid MalGAN Based Malware Prediction
At the end, we set the hybrid MalGAN -based similarity function as following:
S = w1 ∗ St+ w2 ∗ Si
St is text− based similarity function
Si is image− based similarity function
For the initiation, w1 = 50% w2 = 50%
The prediction results based on Hybrid MalGAN model are shown in table 17,18.
From the results above,we can find there some positive possibility to detect the new malware through the Mal-GAN
algorithms under the support of prediction models.
5 Summary
Based on the analysis of the characteristics of malware behavior data, this paper constructs a series classification
algorithm through traditional machine learning algorithms and deep neural network algorithms, and compares the
results with the rule-based malware classification system on two different types of task sets. By the analysis of table 2,
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Table 17: The Prediction Covering Rate in case 1 By Hybrid MalGAN
St T1 Coverage Rate T2 Coverage Rate T3 Coverage Rate
0.15 1 1 1
0.2 1 1 1
0.25 1 1 1
0.5 0.5807055885 0.4126065284 0.3692281185
0.75 0.0057758352 0.0033767487 0.0020675396
0.8 0.0029659694 0.0024119633 0.0012060648
0.9 0.0001561037 0.0001607976 0
0.95 0 0 0
Table 18: The Prediction Covering Rate in case 2 By Hybrid MalGAN
St T1 Coverage Rate T2 Coverage Rate T3 Coverage Rate
0.15 1 1 1
0.2 1 1 1
0.25 1 1 1
0.5 0.7145210638 0.677048512 0.5722365466
0.75 0.0177296619 0.0107623318 0.0049072611
0.8 0.0105122774 0.0048104362 0.0021625218
0.9 0.000470699 0.0003261313 0.0001663478
0.95 0 0 0
table 4, table 5, table 6 we can see that the recognition system based on machine learning and deep learning model can
perform better in accuracy and versatility. In addition, we built several clustering algorithms based on machine learning
and deep learning models for malware family clustering task. Through the result show in table 9 and table 10, we can
see that the supervised machine learning model based on the prior known feature rules perform slightly better than
unsupervised deep learning algorithms. Finally, we construct a GAN model based on malicious sample text and image
data for malicious sample generation, and design a kind of new malware prediction architecture which shows certain
feasibility in the testing dataset.
6 Discussion
The current algorithm in this paper is mainly based on fined large-scale data sets. In the real scene, some malicious
samples are rare, so it is costly to carry out large-scale data set construction and model training. The application of
malware data enhancement by GAN models is also a promising way for malware classification model training. In
addition, transfer learning can be used to conduct model migrations on similar tasks.
This paper only implements several types of deep learning models of TB-Malnet and IB-Malnet to achieve good
performance on the malware dynamic data set, but more accessible samples are static data files, the model build in this
paper should be tested in static malware samples in future.
We found that the malware recognition based on DeepNet performs well and the essence of DeepNet is the feature
extraction of higher dimension. So the high-dimensional features can be associated with the code block position of the
original sample location to construct rules for machine learning algorithms.
At present, DeepNet achieves acceptable accuracy and avoids much manual work. However, the essentials and
interpretability of the deep learning network structure in malware feature extraction need further research to achieve an
optimized model.
The sample generated by MalGAN in this article is unexecutable, we will try to generate an executable malware sample
in future. There is no white sample generation and testing implementation based on MalGAN, which will be completed
in coming research.
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